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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1984 the Agricultural Cooperative Service (ACS) of 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) listed 
5782 agricultural cooperatives in the United States. This 
was approximately 3,000 fewer than existed in 1970 
(Kraenzie et al., 1985). The cooperative system that 
remained was not necessarily in strong financial 
condition. In 1983, 17 percent of cooperatives had net 
worth/asset ratios of less than 0.40. These were not the 
smaller or the weaker cooperatives. They accounted for 53 
percent of total cooperative assets, 35 percent of total 
cooperative net worth, and 28 percent of total cooperative 
net margins (Kraenzie et al., 1985). 
The decline in the number of cooperatives and the 
relatively weak net worth position do not appear to have 
been the result of a low farm customer or patronage base 
for agricultural cooperatives. In 1980, 56 percent of all 
farm operators in the United States used cooperatives 
either as members or as non-member customers. Among 
commercial farmers (those with annual sales of $10,000 or 
more) 71 percent used cooperatives, and 79 percent of 
farms with annual sales of $100,000 or more did business 
with cooperatives in 1980 (Torgeson, 1984). In 1982, U.S . 
farmers purchased 27 percent of their major farm supplies 
and marketed 30 percent of their primary output through 
cooperatives. This was a rise from 23 percent of both 
supplies and primary output passing through cooperatives 
in 1973 (Schrader et al. 1985). 
Changing situations in the agricultural arena have 
continued to place pressure on agricultural cooperatives. 
The period of export growth experienced by U.S. 
agricultural products in the world market during the 1970s 
was replaced by export decline for agricultural products 
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in the 1980s. Government programs instituted in the early 
and mid 1980s idled significant amounts of agricultural 
land for prolonged periods. These conditions have 
increased price-pressure on margins for all agricultural 
industries and have increased the competition for farm 
business. 
Reductions in both the supply of and demand for raw 
agricultural products has left the midwestern grain 
merchandising industry with an oversupply of storage and 
loading capacit y (Ginder, 1985). Federal storage programs 
in the period from 1986 to 1988 injected cash into the 
cooperative system and partially covered the excess 
capacity problem on a temporary basis. The problem 
remains, however, and the elimination of storage programs 
between 1989 and 1992 has caused it to resurface in 
cooperative operating reports. 
Concerns about the state of the cooperative industry 
resulted in a significant expenditure of effort by the ACS 
and others (Cobia et al., 1982; Schrader and Dobson, 1985; 
Royer, 1987 ) on the economic theory of agricultural 
cooperatives during the 1980s. The results of these 
efforts addressed a variety of issues including game-
theoretic models of cooperative initiation and member 
choice, cooperative efficiency in both a micro and a macro 
economic context, and speculation concerning the direction 
of agricultural cooperatives in the future. 
Nearly all of these works are similar in that the 
patronage incentives of the farmer-membership as well as 
t h e f o rmation and rotation of member equity are identified 
as serious and endemic problems in cooperative structure. 
However, these concerns are addressed in a relatively ad 
hoc manner. This suggests that: 
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1. The economic theory of cooperatives accepts 
cooperative structure as prescribed by tradition 
and legal restrictions; 
2. The traditional economic theory of the firm has 
been unable to adequately capture the effects of 
property rights and interests as they exist in the 
typical midwestern agricultural cooperative; 
3. cooperative theory has failed to adequately 
identify and address the multiple activities of 
the cooperative and its membership. 
As problems for cooperative theory, these are largely 
a result of the system of property rights that 
cooperatives have maintained. Cooperative membership and 
investment structures have made it difficult to model 
membership incentives and property rights as these 
entities are not unambiguously recognizable in the real 
world. This problem, however, is not restricted to 
cooperative theory. The same ambiguity that has made 
cooperatives difficult to model using the traditional 
techniques of the economic theory of the firm have also 
made it difficult for the cooperative to maintain farmer-
member investment and patronage incentives. These 
problems were not critical in the postwar period of 
cooperative expansion that lasted through the 1970s. 
However, the recent change in the cooperative 
environment from one of long-term growth to one of excess 
capacity has made these issues central to cooperative 
survival in the 1990s and beyond. It is becoming 
increasingly important for cooperatives to develop a 
system of unambiguous property rights and patronage 
incentives. If the economic theory of cooperatives is to 
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remain relevant to this undertaking, it will have to 
assist in illuminating options by which this can be 
attained. 
In a recent work on cooperative theory, Condon ( 1987) 
proposed that t wo general requirements must be addressed 
for the development of a unified cooperative theory : 
1. The mot ivation of the agents that constitute a 
cooperative enterprise: 
a. Member-patrons; 
b. Members of the cooperative board of 
directors; 
c . Cooperative managers; 
2 . The impact of property rights on cooperative 
structure and performance. 
This contribution does not attempt to create a 
complete unified theory of cooperatives. Instead, it wi ll 
focus on the motivations of member-patrons and the effects 
of property rights on cooperative structure and 
performance. In turning away from the motivati ons of 
cooperative directors and managers, this analysis agrees 
with Schrader et al. ( 1985 ; 3): 
There is no a priori reason to expect a greater 
disparity between the objectives of owners or members 
and management in cooperative s than in proprietary 
firms unless that managers of cooperatives are 
constrained differently or have more discretion in the 
use of the firm's resources. 
It does appear to be true that cooperative managers 
are constrained differently than managers of non-
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cooperative firms and may be allowed more (or less) 
discretion in the use of the firm's resources. 
Cooperative managers face an expanded optimization problem 
where individual farm operating profits are a 
consideration. Because cooperative customers are also 
cooperative owners by definition, customer profits have a 
direct effect on cooperative management and activities. 
This results in on-farm assets and cash-flow 
considerations (which a noncooperative firm could ignore) 
that must be considered in any cooperative action. 
In addition, the cooperative's distribution of 
operating surplus on a patronage basis restricts 
management's ability to redirect assets. Resource 
allocation and pricing decisions in the cooperative are 
recognized by the membership as income distribution 
decisions, making them subject to patron review as well as 
investor review. However, all of these management 
constraints are a result of the cooperative structure of 
property rights and their effects on member portfolio 
decisions. Alternative structures and their resulting 
property rights will inevitably affect the constraints on 
cooperative management through this same mechanism. 
The focus of this work will be cooperative property 
rights and membership incentives as they exist in grain 
marketing and supply cooperatives commonly found in the 
Midwest region of the United States. This restriction 
will allow for a more concise comparison of the current 
and proposed structures of property rights and membership 
incentives. Many of the ideas included here have been 
derived from and may be applicable to other agricultural 
cooperative environments. 
The goal of this work is to identify a model of 
cooperative organization that avoids the farm portfolio 
pitfalls of current financial structures but maintains 
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cooperative benefits and membership incentives. The 
advantages of an explicitly partitioned approach to the 
practical application of cooperative theory will be 
discussed. It is hoped that these advantages will be 
applicable to extension economists in their interaction 
with cooperative organizations and to academic economists 
in their pursuit of a more consistent theory of 
cooperatives. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into five 
chapters . Chapter 2 reviews accepted agricultural 
c ooperative theory with respect to member-cooperative 
resource allocation. Chapter 3 develops a descriptive 
model of the member-cooperative relationship in a real-
world context and identifies failures of the relationship 
to account for property rights and patronage incentives in 
the cooperative organization. Chapter 4 discusses 
possible causes and consequences of the failure of 
cooperative theory and practice to account for property 
rights. Chapter 5 offers the framework of club good 
theory as a means of restructuring selected cooperative 
activities to provide meaningful property rights and 
patronage incentives. Chapter 6 provides a review of 
results and conclusions. 
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CHAPI'ER 2. COOPERATIVE THEORY 
An agricultural cooperative is generally defined 
(Schrader et al., 1985) as a farm supply or marketing 
business where the following conditions hold true: 
1. The business is owned and controlled by the 
agricultural producers who utilize it; 
2. More than half of the business' activity is 
generated through member patronage; 
3. Returns over cost are distributed on the basis of 
patronage; 
4. Returns on capital are limited by legal 
constraints. 
The traditional view of this is that a cooperative 
consists of a small number of farmers who have personally 
joined together as a group to improve their well-being as 
farmers. This may be done by ensuring their access to 
critical input and output markets, by facilitating access 
to beneficial services not provided elsewhere, or by 
coordinating production and marketing activities. In many 
cases, cooperative formation is a response to either a 
monopolistic noncooperative firm or a situation in which 
no market access exists. In these situations the 
cooperative provides a competitive yardstick for 
transactions made by both the members and the nonmembers 
in the cooperative's area. 
The traditional view has had two common variants. 
One variant viewed the cooperative as a vertically 
integrated extension of the member farms. This work has 
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generally been identified with work done by Phillips 
(1953). The other variant, which is often identified with 
the work of Helmberger and Hoos (1962), has viewed the 
cooperative as a separate firm which functions as an 
independent risk-bearer under separate management. 
Although much effort was expended in the 1950s and 
1960s arguing the merits of each approach, Sexton (1984) 
has shown that both approaches are compatible in cases 
where each individual member's patronage level is so small 
as to be insignificant with respect to the aggregated 
patronage of the entire membership. Under this conditions 
the Cournot-Nash behavior that underpins the vertical 
integration theories and the price-taking behavior that is 
a basis for independent firm theories lead to the same 
result. Sexton ' s result depends upon earlier work by 
Trifon (1961). 
It appears that the choice of theoretical vehicles in 
this debate has been primarily influenced by the questions 
asked. Investigations into how farm units financed 
cooperatives or how cooperatives formed were generally 
placed in the context of the vertically integrated firm. 
This facilitated the link between individual farm 
interests and cooperative capitalization. Questions 
concerning the operating efficiency of cooperatives have 
generally been framed in terms of the independent firm. 
This has allowed theorists to focus on input and output 
relationships while abstracting away from membership 
incentives and property rights. Because this research 
pursues portfolio questions, property rights, and the 
resulting patronage incentives between the cooperative and 
its membership, the discussion here will be primarily 
grounded in terms associated with the vertically 
integrated firm. 
Under the integrated firm approach, farmers 
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developing a cooperative are primarily attempting to 
enhance their own individual farm incomes rather than 
creating a profitable independent firm. The cooperative 
business is not treated as an entity separate from the 
activities of its individual members, each of whom behave 
as if the cooperative activity is a direct extension of 
their farm business. 
A Simple Resource Allocation Model 
The first attempt at a detailed presentation of 
resource allocations between member farms and the 
cooperative was done by Phillips {1953). Phillips viewed 
the cooperative as a voluntary federation of independent 
farmer-members. He explicitly identified member investment 
in a cooperative marketing or supply venture as an input 
allocation decision. Individual cooperative members were 
assumed to weigh the expected return on investment in 
personal farm production enterprises against the expected 
return on investment in the cooperative enterprise. 
Individual cooperative members, if they behave rationally, 
will invest their capital resources in the enterprise that 
shows higher expected marginal returns to investment. 
In addition, the member has an incentive to transfer 
existing investments from an enterprise with relatively 
low expected marginal returns to an enterprise with 
relatively high expected marginal returns on investment 
until the expected marginal returns on both enterprises 
are equated. In other words, Phillips assumed that 
cooperative members invest resources in their individual 
and cooperative enterprises in much the same manner as 
speculators invest in stock f or a return on equity. 
Farm production in the presence of a simple supply 
cooperative could be represented by the function 
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(1) 
where 
m is the product marketed by the cooperative 
members; 
k is the input supplied by the cooperative; 
x j1 is a vector of j inputs utilized on i member farms 
where j = (1,2,3, ... ,z) and i = (1,2,3, ... ,n). 
Because farm input k is provided by the cooperative, 
it is further characterized by 
(2) 
where 
K is the source input that the cooperative uses to 
produce k; 
x jc is the vector of j inputs utilized by the 
cooperative in transforming K into k. 
The transformation of K into k is not necessarily a 
change in form through processing or conditioning. It may 
be the process of commodity transfer through time or 
space, or of breaking large lots into smaller quantities. 
Cooperative transformations in both supply and marketing 
functions can be transformations in time, form, and/or 
space. 
Because the cooperative is viewed as a direct 
extension of farm operations, the farm production 
function, m, can be generalized as 
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(3) 
allowing us to construct a net revenue function 
(4) 
where 
r is the net revenue received from farm sales of m; 
P. is the market price received by cooperative 
members for m; 
PK is the market price the cooperative pays for K; 
wj are the market prices for all inputs x j regardless 
of where they are utilized. 
It is assumed that all prices are fixed and known. 
Differentiating the net revenue function gives 
Setting the differential equal to zero shows that the 
marginal revenue of farm production must equal the sum of 
the marginal cost of cooperative production of k and the 
marginal cost incurred at the farm level for the equation 
to be maximized. 
Taking the first order conditions for the individual 
inputs shows 
(6) 
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(8) 
From these equations it follows that the ratios of 
marginal value products of any combination of inputs x j 
and K (the marginal rates of technical substitution) must 
equal the corresponding ratios of input costs wj and P1c: 
(the marginal rate of transformation) for net farm 
production revenue to be maximized. This is true 
regardless of whether the input use is on one of the i 
individual farms or at the cooperative operation. At the 
maximum net return, the marginal value products for 
incremental increases in utilization of any input at any 
location are equal. 
The same results hold for a marketing cooperative 
that is viewed as a vertically integrated firm. In the 
marketing context, however, it is cooperative net revenue 
that is maximized and input k comes to the process in its 
final form. 
M = M (m,~c) (9) 
where 
M is the product marketed by the cooperative; 
m is the farm output that is now marketed through 
the cooperative rather than at the farm level. 
However, m is still produced under the production 
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function that appears in equation 1. This allows M to be 
generalized 
(10) 
In this production function, however, input k is purchased 
from a noncooperative source, so K is no longer a variable 
in the system. 
A net revenue function can again be constructed 
(11) 
where 
R is the net revenue from cooperative marketing; 
P" is the market price that cooperative receives for 
its output, M; 
Pk is the market price that individual farm-members 
pay for input k. 
Setting the differential of this net revenue function 
equal to zero and taking the first order conditions would 
give similar results to those obtained for the supply 
cooperative discussed above. 
In order for any given member to maximize prof its 
through individual operations and the utilization of the 
joint plant in this model, it is necessary that all other 
members' joint plant utilization levels are fixed and 
known. The individual entrepreneur considers his cost of 
utilization of the joint plant as the addition to joint 
operating costs engendered by his added utilization over 
and above the level of utilization that would exist in his 
absence. In essence, the Phillips model assumes that each 
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individual member engages in Cournot-Nash behavior to 
maximize total operational profits from the entire 
integrated process . 
In this simple cooperative portfolio, the 
cooperative's capital needs are provided ex ante by the 
individual members on the basis of each member ' s 
anticipated activity (patronage level) within the 
cooperative. Any discrepancies between anticipated and 
actual patronage are accounted for when the proceeds of 
the joint undertaking are distributed back to the members 
(on a patronage basis) . Cooperative operations are 
transaction-based. Cooperative investments are relatively 
short-term. Cooperative actions are financed and 
undertaken on an individual basis. Under this view of 
finance, only active members have a capital investment in 
the cooperative, as capital is provided up-front in 
anticipation of patronage. 
Average Cost and Patronage-based Distributions 
In this simple exposition of the farm/ cooperative 
portfolio, the farm incentive and financial commitment to 
the cooperative seem relatively clear cut. However, there 
is a question of the pricing structure for the 
cooperative's output and the resulting patronage 
incentives to farmers. Aresvick (1955) pointed out that 
cooperative members are faced with average (rather than 
marginal) costs and revenues in their transactions with 
the joint plant or cooperative in this model. Trifon 
(1961) went farther to point out that the individual 
member is faced both with the average cost of the marginal 
transaction and the change in the average cost caused by 
that transaction as it affects all previous transactions. 
These arguments proceed from the distribution of all 
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cooperative returns on a patronage-share rather than on an 
investment-share basis. If the cooperative operates at 
the point of minimum average cost this presents no 
complications; as average cost equals marginal cost at 
this point. When inefficient markets result in operations 
where average cost is lower than the margin, there is an 
incentive for members to over-utilize their joint plant. 
The recognition and use of average costs rather than 
marginal costs as the cooperative decision variable was a 
sharp break with the accepted theory of the private firm. 
Some writers have assumed that, over the long run, 
cooperatives would restrict membership, if necessary, to 
maintain volumes at optimal average cost (Helmberger and 
Hoos, 1962; Trifon, 1961). 
The average-cost problem at this level can be argued 
to be a matter of perception. Because capital is provided 
ex ante in proportion to anticipated patronage, patronage-
based distribution of surplus is equivalent to investment-
based distributions if patronage levels are accurately 
forecast. It can also be argued that farmer-members at 
this level can distinguish between price benefits and 
investment benefits because they consciously invest in the 
short-term cooperative activities that result in the 
surplus. 
The Model and Established Cooperatives 
The simple portfolio model provides a useful picture 
during the initial organizational phase of many 
cooperatives. Frequently, however, it has little in 
common with the operation and member relationships that 
exist in the cooperative that has been in business for an 
extended period of time. Consequently, it does not 
provide an accurate description of the relationships that 
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currently characterize midwestern grain marketing and 
supply cooperatives. These cooperatives are large 
professionally managed operations with substantial 
permanent capital investments in grain storage and loading 
facilities, agricultural supply inventories, and 
specialized equipment pools. In many cases, these 
cooperative business enterprises are the major private 
sector employers in their respective communities. 
These factors make portfolio issues, investment, and 
membership incentives more problematic. Ongoing 
cooperatives need a continuous system of investment as 
membership rolls over and the institution grows. In the 
noncooperative firm this function can be met through the 
sale of equities in the open market where current owners 
can transfer shares to future owners or additional stock 
can be issued by the firm. This is not an option for 
cooperatives, however, where ownership is legally limited 
to patrons and stocks are continuously valued at par. 
Cooperative members lack incentives to invest in 
cooperatives because there is no investment-based return . 
Because cooperative surplus is distributed on a patronage-
share rather than an investment-share basis, the 
individual member has an incentive to maximize cooperative 
utilization and minimize investment. In addition, the 
absence of a market for cooperative shares and continuous 
share valuation at par prevent the individual member from 
realizing any direct capital gains or suffering any losses 
from the investment's appreciation or depreciation over 
time. 
The result is an i ncentive for individual members to 
become free-riders by minimizing their contributions to 
the cooperative's capitalization. Cooperatives in the 
Midwest and elsewhere have addressed this problem by 
instituting the practice of retaining a portion of the 
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surplus generated by cooperative operations. This 
provides a rudimentary means of accumulating capital on 
the basis of current patronage. However, without a set of 
mechanisms in place to maintain capital proportional to 
patronage, this will result in a set of overinvested 
senior members and a set of under-invested junior members 
as patronage declines for members who are exiting the 
cooperative (generally older members leaving active 
farming). 
A recent article by Knoeber and Baumer (1983) 
attempts to explain the retention of cooperative surplus 
(retained earnings) as an active decision on the part of 
farmer-members to eliminate the free rider problem. 
Knoeber and Baumer develop a mathematical framework which 
demonstrates how average income flows and income flow 
variances determine the expected investment return to the 
cooperative member for both the individual enterprise and 
the cooperative unit. These expected returns then 
determine a joint decision by the membership to forego the 
cash distribution of a portion of the c ooperative 
operating surplus. 
While the Knoeber and Baumer solution provides a 
detailed model of portfolio decision making that is 
inclusive of risk and variance, it does not directly 
address the problem at hand. First, the model seeks to 
explain a portfolio investment decision involving two 
enterprises in which costs and profits cannot be 
separated. By leaving no exit option (avoiding the 
inclusion of game theory), the Knoeber and Baumer argument 
faces an independence problem that had been pointed out by 
Trifon (1961; 226), 
No procurement cooperative faces a revenue function 
independent of its costs (including payments to 
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members' capital); and while a marketing cooperative 
does face such an independent function, there does not 
exist an independent revenue function for the plants 
that patronize it. Consequently, it is hard to 
conceive a comparison of the marginal value products of 
a resource between a cooperative plant and a plant 
which patronizes it. 
From the farmer-member perspective, the distinction 
between farm and cooperative returns does not exist at 
this level. 
Knoeber and Baumer have also oversimplified the farm-
members ' decision-making environment. In assuming that 
retained surplus is actively treated as direct cooperative 
investment by the individual farmer-members, they 
implicitly assume that all surplus (distributed or 
undistributed) is directly allocated to the membership; 
providing the individual with some claim against the 
cooperative in return. In the real world, a significant 
proportion of cooperative operating surplus may be 
retained and, in many cases, is not allocated to the 
membership. Short of cooperative dissolution, the 
individual member has no claim upon such surplus. The 
Knoeber and Baumer model also depends upon the implicit 
assumption that the return of capital (in addition to 
return on capital) occurs at some point in the future. 
This, too, is untenable in the face of unallocated surplus 
retention. Finally, the model requires the assumption 
(again implicitly) that member equities are in some way 
proportional to patronage at the model's starting point. 
In the Midwestern grain cooperative this is not the 
case. In nearly all of these institutions, the 
memberships are second- or third-generation and have not 
provided capital up-front in anticipation of patronage. 
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Most have established their membership for a nominal fee 
(often less than $100) and earn their capital investment 
through future patronage (Junge and Ginder, 1986). 
Surplus is not entirely credited to individual farmer-
mernbers. Finally, members do have the option of exiting, 
reducing patronage levels, or withholding patronage 
altogether; and many regularly exercise one or more of 
these options. 
SWllDlary 
This chapter has provided a generally accepted 
definition of the agricultural cooperative and a 
discussion of the traditional view regarding membership 
incentives for cooperative formation. An early resource 
allocation model (the Phillips model) is presented and 
analyzed, and the average cost problem entailed by 
patronage-based surplus distributions is introduced. 
Finally, the underlying assumptions of this model are 
compared with existing relationships between farmer-
members and their cooperatives in the midwest. It is 
concluded that while the traditional model is still a 
useful tool for conceptualizing cooperative formation, it 
is not sufficient to explain current membership incentives 
within the midwestern grain cooperative. 
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CHAPl'ER 3. A DESCRIPI'IVE COOPERATIVE MODEL 
Within actual organizational structures, initial 
investments and the distribution of surplus in most 
Midwestern grain cooperatives cannot be simplified to the 
point where it reasonably fits the portfolio decision 
models outlined above. It may be instructive to look at 
the following descriptive model of current cooperative 
investment and surplus features in order to understand the 
problems that it presents. 
Cooperative Investment 
Cooperative investments come from a pool o f capital 
that each potential member allocates to farm production 
and marketing operations. In this sense, we look at 
cooperative investment as part and parcel of the farm 
decision process as an integrated operation. This 
analysis is not designed to investigate the global 
portfolio decisions of the potential members. Any capital 
the potential member allocates to nonf arm uses is not 
considered here. The model assumes a decision to invest 
in farm operations as a requirement for our population of 
potentials. 
The make-up of the investment pool that we are 
considering is outlined here . 
where 
(12) 
I is the total farm investment pool aggregated over 
potential membership; 
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I
1 
is the individual farm investment pool of the i tb 
farmer. 
where 
I c1 is the i th farmer's allocation of the farm 
investment pool to the cooperative; 
I P'1 is the i th farmer's allocation of the farm 
investment pool to the i th farm. 
where 
(13) 
(14) 
I c is the total cooperative investment aggregated 
across the entire membership. 
where 
y 
Ici = IE+ L STi 
T •l 
(15) 
I 2 is the one-time cash-up-front membership 
commitment required from each cooperative member; 
ST1 is the i tb farm-member's share of any cooperative 
operating surplus from a given operating period, 
T, that is retained by the cooperative. 
The implications of equation 1 5 will become more apparent 
below where the distribution of cooperative operating 
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surplus is explained. At this point i t is sufficient to 
note that the cooperative is able to exercise substantial 
discretion to influence both the absolute and relative 
sizes of the components of Ic1. 
Cooperative Returns to the i~ Farm 
The cooperative provides excludable membership 
returns in three forms. The first is the accumulation of 
savings in the event that the cooperative provides any 
price advantages to its membership relative to prices 
available from competing noncooperative firms. The second 
is the accrual to membership of any surplus earnings that 
the cooperative generates through operations. The third 
is embodied in access to services or markets that the 
farm-member would forgo in the absence of the cooperative. 
Access to services and markets can be conceived as an 
extension of price advantages. This is true even where 
access to goods and services is a major incentive to 
cooperative membership because noncooperative firms do not 
exist or are ineffective. There is a price advantage to 
an accessible service at an affordable price versus the 
infinite price of an inaccessible service. While this is 
an extreme, it does allow the reduction of direct 
advantages to two forms, price advantages and surplus, 
that are conceptually easier to work with. 
In cases where the market provides for prices that 
exceed average costs, the cooperative has extensive 
latitude in determining whether membership benefits are in 
the form of price advantages or surplus. As we will see 
later, this directly affects the ownership and patronage 
incentives of the farm-members. 
The successful cooperative also provides an important 
public return to both members and nonmembers by forcing 
23 
competition and the resulting pricing and behavior on 
other dominant firms that could otherwise pursue 
monopolistic or oligopolistic trade practices. This is 
often referred to as the cooperative yardstick function. 
Because this benefit is freely available to all, 
regardless of cooperative membership, the current model 
does not deal with it as a membership return. 
The following equations outline the structure of 
membership incentives and their sources in each form. 
Both forms need to account for the differences in flows 
between marketing and supply activities undertaken by the 
cooperative. 
Price Advantages 
Price advantages for cooperative marketing activities 
are outlined in the following equations. 
(16) 
where 
P. is the output price offered to farms by the 
cooperative; 
P.o is the output price offered to farms by competing 
noncooperative firms ; 
where 
is the price advantage (if positive) or 
disadvantage (if negative) from patronizing the 
cooperative. 
(17) 
A.1 is the total benefit to the i~ farm from price 
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advantage A.; 
m1 is the quantity of itb farm's output sold through 
the cooperative. 
Price advantages for the farmer utilizing cooperative 
supply facilities are outlined below: 
where 
Pko is the supply price offered to farms by 
noncooperative firms; 
Pk is the supply price offered to farms by the 
cooperative; 
(18) 
Ak is the price advantage (if positive) or 
disadvantage (if negative) from patronizing the 
cooperative. 
(19) 
where 
Ak1 is the total benefit to the itb farm from price 
advantage Ak; 
k 1 is the quantity of itb farm's input purchased 
through the cooperative. 
Surplus Generation 
Accounting for cooperative surplus accruing to the 
i~ farm is complicated by distribution and property 
rights as well as by supply and marketing operations. The 
next section provides a simplified outline of the sources 
of cooperative surplus. The distribution of this surplus, 
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as well as notes on this distribution's attendant 
membership rights, are supplied in the subsequent section. 
Surplus generated from marketing activities are 
derived from 
where 
(20) 
m is the total member-farm output marketed by the 
cooperative. 
(21) 
which is identical to equation 9 above. Again, it should 
be noted that the transformation of commodities by both 
supply and marketing cooperative activities is not 
necessarily a change in form. These transformations can 
be utility enhancing movements through time and space as 
well as changes in form. 
Multiplying the product marketed by the cooperative, 
M, by its market price, P", and subtracting cooperative 
transformation costs, Cx, and initial raw product payments 
(if any) made to farmer-members, P.,m, results in 
cooperative operating surplus, s •. 
(22) 
given 
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(23) 
where 
CK are the costs to the cooperative of transforming m 
into M and of moving M forward into the market 
channel from the farm; 
Sm is the total cooperative surplus generated by 
marketing transactions. 
Moving forward into the market channel does not ref er 
to a futures market. In defining forward and backward 
movements in the market channel from the farm cooperative 
perspective, we view the agricultural input, production, 
and output markets as a straight line or channel. 
Products move forward through the channel as they progress 
towards the final consumer. The farm stands in this 
channel and agricultural inputs and supplies flow to it 
from the rear. The farm sells its output forward into the 
channel. If the farm belongs to a cooperative, the 
cooperative acts as the farm's agent in these 
transactions. As a result, forward into the market 
channel, for the purposes of this discussion, is the 
movement of farm output to the first postcooperative stage 
of processing or consolidation. Backward into the market 
channel is the final precooperative source of agricultural 
inputs. 
Finally, the individual farmer-member's share of 
cooperative operating surplus is distributed on a 
patronage-share basis. Total cooperative operating 
surplus, s., is multiplied by the ratio of the individual 
farm's raw product deliveries , mi, to the aggregate raw 
product deliveries of all farmer-members, m. 
2 7 
(24) 
where 
s.1 is the amount of s. accruing to the i th farmer. 
Surplus generation from cooperative supply operations 
are similar to those in the marketing context. 
n 
k = I: k i 
i=l 
(25) 
where 
k is the total quantity of f arm input k purchased 
from the cooperative. 
(26) 
which is identical to equation 2, above. 
(27) 
where 
PK is the price paid by the cooperative for the 
input, K, obtained from entities backward in the 
market channel; 
Ck are the costs to the cooperative of transforming K 
into k and moving k through the market channel to 
the farm; 
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s k is the total cooperative surplus generated by 
supply transactions. 
where 
(28) 
ski is the amount of s k accruing to the i tb farmer. 
Summing the surpluses generated by both the supply 
and marketing operations gives 
(29) 
where 
s is the total cooperative operating surplus. 
(30) 
where 
Si is the amount of total cooperative surplus that 
accrues to the i~ member. 
Both of the above equations assume that the cooperative is 
engaged in both supply and marketing operations. The case 
for cooperatives engaging in only one operation can easily 
be represented by setting one of the component parts equal 
to zero. 
In general, cooperative surplus generation is not 
recognizable to the farm-member at the transaction stage. 
The assumption that the i tb farm-member's patronage level 
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is insignificant relative to total patronage, which 
justifies the assumptions of either price-taking or 
Cournot-Nash behavior, results in the ratios m1/m and k1 / k 
(equations 12 and 16, respectively) approaching zero. 
These ratios determine the share of cooperative operating 
surplus that each member, i, realizes. From this we can 
assume that the farmer-member behaves as if s.1 and Sk1 
each equal zero. 
This would indicate that farm-members do not directly 
recognize their share of cooperative surplus in general. 
At the individual transaction level, the lack of surplus 
recognition would be even more pronounced. As a result, 
it can be expected that farm-members have strong 
incentives to be price-motivated at the transaction point. 
It is expected that members patronize cooperatives because 
of actual and immediate price advantages. These 
advantages may exist as actual price differentials on 
identical products or as quality or service differentials 
on similarly priced products. Where the cooperative 
provides a price disadvantage, the farm-member has an 
incentive to do business where the lowest immediate 
transaction price is available. 
Taken together, a zero expectation of surplus and 
price-motivation at the point of transaction provide 
reasonable support to the found-money argument of Junge 
and Ginder (1986). This states that member equity 
generated in the form of cooperative surplus is capital 
that would not be available to the farm-member had that 
farm-member elected to do business with a noncooperative 
investor-owned firm. 
In the noncooperative firm, surplus would accrue to 
the stockholders on an investment-share basis and the 
patron would receive no refund. This results in farm-
members treating any cooperative surplus distributions as 
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found-money. The farm-member recognizes no direct 
investment in surplus generation, and surplus retention by 
the cooperative entails no on-farm opportunity costs. In 
reality, surplus is not predictably available for use in 
other on-farm investment; and if the surplus is retained 
by the cooperative, farmer-members are no worse off than 
they would be if they had patronized noncooperative firms. 
By the same reasoning, the loss of retained surplus 
by the cooperative also entails no immediately 
recognizable on-farm opportunity cost. It was noted 
earlier that where the market allows prices that exceed 
average cost the cooperative has significant leeway in 
determining whether membership returns take the form of 
price advantages or operating surplus. In situations 
where the cooperative has retained surplus in the form of 
member equity or can monetize physical capital through 
collateralized debt this is also true. Even where prices 
received by the cooperative are below the level of average 
costs this option exists in the short run. In these 
cases, the cooperative can consume equity (direct 
investments or retained surplus from previous periods) in 
order to maintain price advantages and membership 
patronage levels. 
Farm-member incentives in the case of equity 
depletion at the transaction point, however, are the same 
as in the case of surplus generation. The assumptions of 
price-taking or Cournot-Nash behavior result in the farm-
member not recognizing transaction effects on equity. It 
would be expected that even in the case that a farm-member 
did recognize that cooperative pricing was eroding the 
cooperative capital base, the assumed behavior would still 
prevent that individual from foregoing immediate, 
recognized, and accruable price advantages at the 
cooperative's expense. 
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Surplus Distribution 
Cooperative surplus can be split at least four ways 
for the purposes of distribution. A simplified outline of 
surplus distribution with observations on attendant 
property rights is provided below. 
where 
S0 is the amount of cooperative surplus that is 
distributed to the membership in cash; 
(31) 
ST is the amount of cooperative surplus during any 
operating period that is retained for cooperative 
use as either allocated equity or as unallocated 
equity. 
In this first division, a portion can be distributed 
to the farm-member as a qualified cash distribution (So) . 
The second portion, ST, is retained by the cooperative. 
This retention can take a number of forms which are 
outlined below. Each form has different implications with 
respect to the farm-member's current i ncome and 
cooperative property rights. 
(32) 
where 
S0 is the amount of qualified cooperative surplus 
allocations to the membership that is retained by 
the cooperative; 
SN is the amount of nonqualified cooperative surplus 
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allocations to the membership that is retained by 
the cooperative; 
Su is the amount of retained cooperative surplus that 
is not allocated to the membership. 
The distinction between qualified and nonqualif ied 
allocations of surplus hinges on the cooperative's legal 
status as a tax exempt extension of the farmer-member's 
individual farming operations. The cooperative qualifies 
for this tax exempt status to the extent that it carries 
out transactions at cost and promptly refunds operating 
surpluses on a patronage basis. For an allocation or 
refund of operating surplus to be qualified and exempt 
from taxation as cooperative income, three conditions must 
be met. 
First, the distribution must be made within nine 
months of the end of the cooperative's fiscal year. 
Second, at least twenty percent of the allocation must be 
distributed to patrons in the form of cash. Finally, the 
cooperative must give the farmer-member written notice of 
the allocation's tax status when the allocation is made . 
Under these conditions, surplus allocations qualify 
as transaction refunds and are not taxed to the 
cooperative, regardless of whether the cooperative does 
retain up to eighty percent of the allocation as to the 
membership's stock of equity. The full value of qualified 
allocations, regardless of the portion received in cash, 
is taxable as current income to the farmer-member that 
receives the allocation. 
If these conditions are not met, surplus allocations 
do not qualify as transaction refunds and are taxed to the 
cooperative as ordinary business income. At whatever 
future date these nonqualif ied allocations are redeemed to 
the patrons, the cooperative receives a tax credit and the 
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allocation becomes an income tax liability to the farmer-
member. 
The total cooperative surplus, regardless of how it 
is allocated, and its component parts can be represented 
in the form of individual farmer-member shares. 
(33) 
where 
Soi is the amount of qualified surplus received by the 
i~ member in cash; 
S0 i is the amount of retained qualified cooperative 
surplus that is allocated to the i~ member; 
S"i is the amount of retained nonqualif ied cooperative 
surplus that is allocated to the i~ member; 
S0 i is the amount of retained and unallocated 
cooperative surplus correspondi ng to the i~h 
member's patronage share. 
The retention of surplus by the cooperative in the 
form of qualified allocations of equity shares to the 
farmer-member (S0 ) results in a current tax liability to 
the farmer-member. Such surplus also earns no return, is 
not marketable, and does not fluctuate with asset value. 
Finally, it is generally redeemable at the cooperative's, 
rather than the farmer-member's discretion. 
Retained surplus allocated to farmer-members as 
nonqualified allocations (S") provides a recognizable 
claim on the cooperative, but avoids placing an immediate 
(and, perhaps, partially unfunded) tax liability on the 
farmer-member. As is the case with s0 , however, the 
farmer-member's claim against the cooperative can 
generally be exercised only at the cooperative's discretion. 
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The retention of either qualified or nonqualified 
allocations by the cooperative in the form of member 
equity shares causes a present value problem for the 
member. Because the equity is not marketable, pays no 
return, and is continuously valued at par it creates a 
present value problem in the portfolio. Its value is 
continuously eroded during inflationary periods, and its 
value increases during periods of deflation. 
The fourth option for distribution is cooperative 
retention of surplus without allocation to the membership 
(Su). This option, like Sw, places the current tax 
liability on the cooperative rather than on the farmer-
members. However, s 0 differs from S" and s 0 in that it 
provides the farmer-member with no identifiable future 
claim against the cooperative. If an identifiable future 
claim were present, Su would also result in a present 
value problem for the member. 
The preceding equations show that while surplus 
generation is a straight-forward derivation of costs and 
prices, its distribution is complex. Typically, the 
division of surplus among these categories is not placed 
before farmer-members as an option to approve or deny. 
There is no continuum of choices by which to mediate 
individual preferences as is assumed by Knoeber and Baumer 
(1983). In fact, most cooperative by-laws require that 
the board select a surplus allocation alternative and 
present the result to the membership after the fact. 
Membership claims on cooperative surplus and the resulting 
patronage incentive structure are clearly not the 
foundation for strong farmer-member interest in affecting 
surplus distribution. 
The assumptions of price-taking and Cournot-Nash 
behavior again lead to the conclusion that the size of the 
individual farmer-member's operation relative to the group 
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as a whole makes the individual's impact on group 
decisions negligible. Even where farmer-member control is 
on a one-member-one vote basis rather than on an 
investment or patronage basis, the size of the membership 
group leads to this result. It should be assumed that the 
conclusions of Mancur Olson's large-group analysis (Olson, 
1965) are applicable in this situation. The 
representative farmer-member views cooperative decisions 
and voting outcomes as public goods. The benefits that 
result from any individual effort to affect these outcomes 
accrue primarily to non-participants. Each member has an 
incentive to minimize individual effort at affecting joint 
outcomes. 
In cases where individual farmer-members do have 
enough patronage to influence cooperative operations, 
strategic action by individuals may indirectly affect 
cooperative management decisions. Such decisions may be 
swayed by threats or perceived threats to either exit or 
withhold patronage. Farmer-members with relatively large 
patronage shares have incentives to influence cooperative 
decisions in this manner as pointed out by Trifon (1961). 
It may also be worthwhile to point out the difference 
between the incentives of a representative farmer-member 
and a farmer-member with aspirations towards the 
cooperative's board of directors . Election to the board 
of directors may result in status or value apart from the 
decision making process for certain individuals. This, 
again, results in a group of members that have an atypical 
interest in cooperative decision making . It may be that 
the median-voter behavior of Knoeber and Baumer (1983) is 
relevant in situations where every member wants a board 
seat. This situation may also, however, lead directly 
back to Olson's small-group analysis, where all members 
are associated closely enough to recognize direct returns 
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from group participation and individual attempts to 
influence the decision-making process. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, observation indicates 
that in the usual cooperative context the representative 
farmer-member does not directly influence cooperative 
decision making. Coupled with controlled choice and the 
found-money nature of the assets involved, this reinforces 
the conclu sion that the individual farmer-member is not 
actively involved in the surplus distribution decision. 
In order to complete the investment circuit, it is 
useful to examine where surplus returned to the farmer-
member' s portfolio goes. Equations 34 through 37 show the 
destinations of the vari ous surplus categories at the 
close of the cooperative accounting period. There is very 
little incentive for the individual farmer to redirect 
surplus distributions to destinations other than those 
shown here. 
Soi - IPi (34) 
All distributed surplus either goes out of the farm 
investment portfolio or remains invested at the individual 
farm level. There is no investment incentive for the 
farmer-member to unilaterally provide capital to the 
cooperative. 
(35) 
(36) 
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(37) 
All retained surplus increases the farmer-member's 
cooperative investment whether or not it is allocated to 
the farm-member. 
Allocated retained surplus becomes an immediate farm-
member tax liability if it meets the rules for qualified 
refunds listed previously. It does not become a tax 
liability if it is allocated as a non-qualified refund (in 
which case it is an immediate tax liability for the 
cooperative). While allocated retained surplus provides 
the farm-member with a claim against the cooperative, this 
claim can only be exercised at the discretion of the 
cooperative. Unallocated retained surplus provides the 
farm-member with no direct claim on the cooperative and 
bestows no ownership rights short of the dissolution of 
the institution. 
Given the found-money nature of cooperative surplus, 
the retenti on of operating surplus by the cooperative 
cannot be equated with farm-member investment . This is 
the case even when a portion o f the retained surplus is 
allocated to the farm-member. While the farm-member will 
receive payment at a future date, the decision to invest 
is strictly out of the farm-member's hands . It is a 
passive rather than an a c tive investment. Recall that 
and 
y 
Ici ; IE+ L STi 
T • l 
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This results in 
(38) 
To the extent that the cooperative successfully skews 
the components of farmer-member investment away from IE, 
this allows it to finance its operations without imposing 
a recognizable opportunity cost on its farmer-members; 
assuming that any current tax liabilities accruing to the 
farmer-member as a result of qualified surplus allocations 
are covered by sufficient cash distributions. 
A short-term capital rotation cycle in which all 
cooperative capital is continuously adjusted to membership 
patronage levels would limit this ability . In the 
extreme , instantaneous capital rotation would require new 
members to fully fund their memberships in order to 
finance either the out-rotation of exiting members or the 
expansion required by increased patronage. 
The reality, however, is that most cooperatives have 
no strict adherence to any instantaneous or short-term 
capital rotation plan that is geared towards patronage-
capital equity. In those cases where such plans exist, 
the appreciation of assets and the retention of 
unallocated retained surplus prevents the complete 
rotation of capital in any event. 
A short-term capital rotation also results in two 
disadvantages for the cooperative. Retention of operating 
surplus is arguably the cheapest source of capital 
available to the cooperative. A restrictive rotation of 
this capital would increase the capital costs of operation 
and expansion. Instantaneous capital rotation leaves no 
one with an incentive for the maintenance of capital or to 
hold investments between transactions. 
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The appreciation of assets that is not accounted for 
by the value of capital stock (either up-front investments 
or allocated retained surplus) and the retention of 
unallocated capital support the statement that the 
cooperative member"··· likely does not even know how much 
he or she has invested in the cooperative system." 
(Ratchford, 1985; 133). It also provides the cooperative 
a means to generate an endowment that is available to 
relatively under-invested members while they build their 
investment through patronage. This endowment, as opposed 
to a conscious decision by the membership to let the 
cooperative to retain surplus, has allowed the typical 
midwestern cooperative to reduce the free-riding problem 
caused by the patronage-based distribution of surplus. 
In moving away from I e and towards S0 , Sx, and S0 for 
financing the cooperative, the farmer-member's decision to 
invest becomes a relatively automatic consequence of 
patronage decisions. Initial cooperative investments 
generally require less than $1000 and, in many instances, 
are possible for $100 or less. Even these nominal values 
can often be covered wi th retained patronage refunds in 
many grain cooperatives. 
All other cooperative equity is generated from 
surplus, found money. In effect, IE has become an access 
fee to the farmer-member. Its small value relative to 
total farm production expenses, coupled with any positive 
level of risk aversion on the farmer-member's part, result 
in IE being inelastic with respect to the potential 
farmer-member's expectations of cooperative price 
advantages. 
Although the endowment is the result of passive 
investment and gives the farmer-member no immediately 
actionable claims, it provides several advantages to the 
cooperative which are generally in the farmer-members' 
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interests. First, it allows the cooperative to solicit 
farmer-memberships without requiring large recognizable 
equity investments. This allows the cooperative to 
maximize its pool of patrons and its market penetration, 
and reduce average costs. Lower average costs are 
important to the representative grain cooperative because 
of the relatively large capital investment required for 
such an operation . Major fixed costs make grain 
marketing, handling, and storage facilities decreasing 
average cost operations. The bulk commodity nature of 
grain puts spatial limits on the cooperative's market 
area. As a result, the cooperative is very sensitive to 
developing a concentrated patronage pool within this area. 
Second, the endowment provides the cooperative with a 
degree of operational independence. This independence 
results from three factors, all of which are a direct 
result of eliminating an active farmer-member choice from 
the investment decision. 
Operating independence is immediately enhanced by 
reducing the conservative attitude that results from the 
farm-member consciously deepening their investment 
commitment to primary agriculture. It must be remembered 
that direct investment in the cooperative is not an act of 
diversification on the part of the farmer-member. The 
lack of independent cost and revenue functions between the 
farm and cooperative plants result in an increasing 
variance in the total return of any individual farmer-
member's global portfolio as cooperative investments are 
increased. By making the cooperative investment process a 
passive act on part of the farmer-member, the cooperative 
reduces the conservatism that such capital deepening can 
be expected to generate. This movement to a passive found 
money investment frees the cooperative to engage in more 
innovative or risky activities on the farmer-members' 
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behalf. 
It should be noted that this alleviation of member 
conservatism is not the result of increasing the diversity 
of the farmer-member portfolio. Rather, it is the result 
of the farmer-members not actively considering the depth 
of their commitment to the cooperative. The farmer-member 
has generally made a passive investment as a consequence 
of a price-motivated patronage decision. The member would 
have been no better off doing business at similar prices 
with a noncooperative firm that kept any business profits. 
The cooperative surplus provides a finite possibility that 
surplus distributions will be received by the farmer-
member at some future date. 
The accumulation of unallocated surplus by the 
cooperative also partially alleviates the truncated 
investment horizon of individual farmer-members . Because 
cooperative equity shares have no market, the expected 
current value of future cooperative earning capacity is 
not embodied in the redemption value of those shares. As 
such, the investment horizon of the membership is limited 
to their periods of active patronage. This tendency 
towards a near-sighted temporary capitalization is again 
alleviated by making farmer-member investment a passive 
act. 
Finally, by making investment and capitalization 
primarily a function of retaining surplus, much as a non-
cooperative firm retains earnings, the cooperative has 
eased its problem of capital access. While the 
cooperative continues to lack the ability to generate 
capital by issuing new equity shares to the public, it 
does not require an ex ante "passing of the hat" to 
increase its capital base. The same is true of 
maintaining the capital base in the event of an operating 
loss. In the absence of an endowment, operating losses 
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would have to be made up through assessments against the 
membership. An endowment makes it easier for the 
cooperative and the farmer-members to manage finances in 
the face of ordinary business fluctuations. 
Capital access is also increased to the extent that 
the endowment makes it easier for the cooperative to 
attract debt capital for long-term projects. While the 
cooperative does have a fixed future commitment to pay out 
allocated retained surplus (which noncooperatives do not), 
its ability to retain surplus increases its debt-carrying 
capacity beyond what would exist in the absence of surplus 
retention. The extent to which the cooperative is able to 
retain unallocated surplus improves this position even 
further. In this case, potential lenders can count on 
cooperative revenue flows and surpluses as a source of 
repayment, much as they would view the revenue and profits 
from a non-cooperative firm. 
Cooperative dependency upon the endowment, however, 
also creates one major disadvantage. By making investment 
a passive act, the cooperative does not provide its farm-
members with an active ownership interest. Cooperative 
membership is, effectively, a free good. At no cost to 
the prospective member, that member obtains rights to 
utilize all of the facilities of the cooperative. 
The assertion that the cooperative farmer-member does 
not actively recognize property interests in the 
cooperative should not lead one to conclude that there are 
no membership incentives for joining or remaining in a 
cooperative. The cooperative may provide market 
competition or access to services that a trade area would 
otherwise lack. Price advantages may exist for the member 
of a cooperative. Finally, there is a finite possibility 
that the found money that makes up the bulk of the 
member's equity will be returned at a future date. All 
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three factors insure that the farmer-member has reason to 
participate. These incentives notwithstanding, the nature 
of the investment path does not provide the farmer-member 
with an active interest in the investment. 
The lack of a recognizable opportunity cost in 
cooperative investment makes each member free to exit from 
the cooperative or to patronize other entities without 
considering the effects of these actions on their own 
cooperative investments and the investments of other 
cooperators. Members are also free to compete directly 
against their cooperative by marketing input supplies and 
custom services or by building private on-farm storage. 
In all of these cases, the farmer-member does not 
recognize a significant participation in cooperative 
losses resulting from individual action. The member is 
thus encouraged to utilize cooperative facilities and 
equity as a common property resource. 
It is somewhat ironic that the very system that makes 
cooperative investment a direct consequence of the 
patronage decision has separated the patronage decision 
from its effect on investment and property interests in 
the mind of the farmer-member. This is directly due to 
the passive nature of the investment relationship between 
the farmer-member and the cooperative. The cooperative 
has become, in effect, an independent entity that the 
farmer-members treat as they would any other supplier of 
inputs or services. The endowment and the near 
elimination of up-front membership capitalization have 
created an environment where the vertically integrated 
firm and portfolio theory add very little to the 
understanding to farmer-member incentives and actions with 
respect to the cooperative. 
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SUJDJDary 
Chapter 3 has presented a descriptive model of 
financial relationships between the cooperative and the 
farmer-member as they currently exist in most midwestern 
grain cooperatives. It has been shown that these 
relationships provide incentives for the farmer-member to 
be primarily motivated by immediate transaction prices in 
making patronage decisions. This is due, in the first 
instance, to the distribution of cooperative operating 
surplus on a patronage basis. The problem is magnified, 
however, by the somewhat arbitrary distribution of claims 
to surplus that result from cooperative allocation 
decisions. 
The farmer-member has very little control over 
cooperative surplus distributions and has no incentives to 
individually invest in the cooperative. The farmer does, 
however, have incentives to be a cooperative member. This 
paradox results from a cooperative structure that does not 
require the individual farmer-member to consciously hold a 
significant stake in the cooperative. As a result, the 
cooperative treats the member as a customer rather than an 
investor, and the farmer-member treats the cooperative as 
an independent supplier rather than as an investment. 
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CHAPl'ER 4. THE COOPERATIVE AS A CAPITAL POOL 
Vertical integration models and portfolio theory do 
not adequately explain farmer-member incentives and 
actions with respect to the cooperative. This does not 
necessarily imply, however, that the early vertical 
integration theorists were wrong in their analyses of the 
cooperatives of the time. The early theories of 
vertically integrated cooperatives were developed to 
explain cooperatives that were far different than the 
cooperatives that exist today. Cooperatives have changed 
because the farm operations that they serve have changed. 
Phillips' integrated cooperative model was 
characterized as either a joint marketing or purchasing 
agreement. The costs of the joint operation were 
primarily operating or variable costs associated with an 
individual transaction. When the transaction was complete 
accounts were cleared, costs were added to or subtracted 
from prices, and no cooperative investment remained. All 
benefits from cooperation were recognizable in the form of 
immediate price advantages. 
This simple cooperative served farms where production 
costs were largely variable operating costs. The farm 
production function was labor intensive. As long as labor 
was freely available in easily divisible units, production 
cost sharing was not a cooperative function. Cooperative 
activities in the production cycle were limited to group 
purchasing of bulk inputs. Likewise; the technology of 
grain marketing and transfer limited cooperative marketing 
needs to the development of a united bargaining front and 
consolidated sales. In both production and marketing 
activities, the cooperative's farmer-member was explicitly 
interested in immediate price advantages rather than long-
term cost sharing. 
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The most immediately necessary expansion to this view 
results from the addition of grain storage facilities. 
Traditionally, grain marketing systems have required 
physical storage facilities in order to consolidate 
commodity lots of sufficient size to enter the market. To 
the extent that grain marketing and transfer technology 
requires permanent facilities for grain consolidation, the 
cooperative cost function expands beyond variable costs. 
This is not a major break, however, as long as the 
facilities are technologically inseparable from the 
marketing activity itself. Facility size and costs, 
determined by shipping lot sizes, could be amortized 
across time and applied to patronage. Patronage is still 
based on price advantages as long as the technology 
required for marketing makes this service unavailable to 
the farmer-member individually. This was long the case 
with respect to rail shipment facilities, given the grain 
transfer capacity of the individual farmer-member. 
The major breaking point in a cooperative model 
dependent upon pure price advantages began to exist as 
farm production technology became capital intensive, and 
as grain transfer and marketing technologies began to 
separate storage facilities from marketing functions. At 
this point, the potential for production capital sharing 
provided a further cost reduction incentive to the farmer-
mernber that was not immediately recoverable in price 
advantages during a single production period. In 
addition, grain storage needs began to be defined in terms 
of production lots rather than shipping lots, storage took 
on a speculative aspect, and transfer technology made on-
farm and cooperative storage relatively interchangeable 
from the member perspective. 
The cooperative was no longer primarily transaction-
based. It also became a capital pool. Mainstream 
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cooperative finance and the economic theory of 
cooperatives, however, both continued to be based on a 
transaction-based paradigm. 
The transaction paradigm results in all benefits 
being defined in terms of patronage. A consequence of 
this is that there are no direct returns to investment. 
Combining this with the democratic control (one member, 
one vote) of cooperatives results in a situation where 
there are generally no specific rights attached to 
investment. Participation in cooperatives usually 
provides only general access to cooperative facilities and 
services. 
From the capital pool perspective, this lack of 
access rights becomes a serious problem for the 
cooperative organization ( even in the face of its ability 
to retain surplus and hold an endowment) . The basic grain 
cooperative is not a risk pool in any real sense of the 
term. Marketing is done on a buy-sell basis that leaves 
the risk of market timi ng largely with the farmer-member . 
Storage and production services are generally provided on 
a first-come, first-serve basis. 
Pooled capital stock with no access guarantees leave 
farmer-members holding significant access risks; 
particularly in periods of unusually high demand. These 
periods are particularly likely for storage facilities 
during bumper crop and\or low market price years. 
Unusually cold or wet planting seasons create these 
situations for production services . 
Midwestern grain producers have generally avoided 
shielding themselves from market risk by shunning attempts 
to create market pools. They tend to look at cooperative 
marketing expertise as a means of maximizing their returns 
to risk rather than a means of risk reduction. However, 
they typically attempt to shield themselves from the 
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access risks involved in capital pools. In order to 
shield themselves from these risks, farmer-members can 
either insure themselves against the losses that these 
risks may entail or protect themselves by reducing the 
risk in~olved (e.g . , building more capacity). In either 
case the farmer-member can chose to act individually or 
collectively through the cooperative. 
Recent work by Shogren (1990) in the field of 
experimental risk reduction suggests that individuals will 
generally opt for private self-protection unless private 
actions are too expensive or too complicated to be 
economically feasible. The operability of both of these 
constraints imply economies of scale in provision. 
Application of Shogren's results to cooperative members 
leads to the expectation that farmer-members will opt for 
private capacity where economies of scale permit private 
provision. As a result, one would expect that relatively 
large and/or financially well-established members will 
more likely to opt for private self-protection than will 
smaller members. 
If established members also perceive that 
insufficient rotation of retained patronage dividends have 
left them overinvested relative to other members, the 
perception that they are subsidizing the free riding of 
other members may further discourage participation in 
cooperative self-protection. Shogren's work suggests that 
an individual's valuation of cooperative and private 
action is sensitive to the perceived productivity of the 
payment made. The perception that payments made for 
cooperative action are diluted by benefits received by 
free riders increases the preference for private action. 
These factors suggest that in the face of immediate 
recognizable access risks, at least some farmer-members 
can be expected to build private capacities in the face of 
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the pooled facilities maintained by their cooperative. 
Once established and paid for, private capital stock 
can be used by the farmer-member at marginal cost. In the 
case of many cooperative facilities in the capital pool, 
decreasing average cost structures require that user fees 
be equated with average cost if the provision of 
facilities is to be self financing. This gives reason to 
believe that private stock, once established, will be 
utilized before the cooperative capital pool in individual 
instances. The marginal cost advantage of using private 
facilities overrides the scale economies of constructing 
cooperative facilities because the member can separate 
fixed from marginal costs in the on-farm utilization 
decision but cannot separate fixed from marginal costs in 
the utilization of the cooperative facility. 
The tendency to utilize private facilities is further 
strengthened if we assume that the use or potential use of 
private stock provides the member with bidding advantages 
with respect to other farm and market activities. If we 
assume that private capacity, once established, is 
utilized prior to collective capacity, this will directly 
affect both the volume and the consistency of utilization 
of services within the capital pool. 
Shogren's results are consistent with several 
previous works (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1988; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichenstein, 1988). 
These works in the field of psychological response to risk 
indicate that individuals overestimate the impact of low-
probability events (particularly in the face of high 
potential losses) and are oversensitive to changes in the 
probabilities of low-probability events. In addition, 
these researchers have shown that response to risk is 
affected by the context in which an event is framed by the 
risk bearer. 
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It is reasonable to assume that the farmer-member's 
decision to provide the largest of the cooperative capital 
pool investments, grain storage, is framed differently 
with respect to cooperative and private action. The 
decision to provide cooperative storage is most likely 
framed in a long-term context where facility access risk 
is perceived to be low, potential impacts of access risk 
are over-estimated, and the farmer-member's opportunity 
cost of constructing storage is covered with cooperative 
surplus (found money). 
One would expect a tendency to over-build cooperative 
storage under these conditions. However, over-building 
does not necessarily eliminate the occurrence of 
individual events that significantly increase access risk 
in the short term. Individual events that temporarily 
increase short-term access risks are likely to frame the 
decision to provide on-farm storage. In the short-term, 
lack of access to storage results in immediate and 
significant losses to the farmer-member that is forced to 
sell grain at the point of harvest. The farmer-member can 
compare potential marketing losses that may result from 
unsuccessful visits (failure to gain access ) to the 
cooperative facility with the provision costs of acquiring 
private storage (self protection) and directly reduce 
access risk through private storage construction. The 
individual benefits from reduced transaction costs because 
coalition-building is avoided. Finally, private provision 
provides a level of certainty against highly correlated 
needs that is not possible with cooperative provision. 
Both of these decision frames suggest the dedication 
of more resources to risk reduction than are economically 
optimal in environments where consistent market experience 
in risk reduction is not present. This is generally the 
environment that exists when farmer-members anticipate 
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excess demand for services from the cooperative's capital 
pool. The infrequent expectation of increase in demand 
and the long-term nature of investments required for self-
protection combine to increase the dedication of resources 
to self-protection over an optimal long-term level. This 
is because both of the conditions present tend to limit 
the repeated market risk-reduction experience that is 
available. 
Shogren's work in experimental risk reduction 
suggests that the development of private capital stock 
will take place if the capital pool carries no specific 
access rights. This expectation is reinforced by a number 
of other factors in the case of grain storage. First, the 
construction of on-farm grain storage was encouraged by 
government programs that subsidized construction costs in 
the 1970s. Government grain storage programs of the 1980s 
also provided incentives for developing on-farm storage. 
In addition, on-farm storage increases a farmer-member's 
ability to seek alternative bids in marketing grain. On-
farm storage of sufficient quantities may allow the member 
to influence bids, or bargain on delivery terms, in some 
instances. 
Regardless of the instigating incentives, it is 
apparent that private on-farm capital stock is developing 
in the face of the cooperative capital pool. The 
assumption that, once obtained, private resources will be 
utilized before cooperative resources creates the 
possibility that the cooperative will become a reservoir 
of excess capacity. This should have the effect of 
driving up unit costs within the cooperative; forcing 
either the consumption of the endowment or a loss of 
patronage as price-motivated members take their business 
elsewhere, or both. This effect is clearly seen in a 
recent analysis of high-volume, low-margin competition in 
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the grain marketing arena (Ginder, 1985). 
Under the present structure of investment and 
ownership rights, this situation is hard for the 
cooperative to combat within the existing membership. 
Attempts to increase capital stock utilization through 
increased membership (lower entry fees) or subsidized 
access costs have the effect of expanding access rights 
and increasing access risk. This has the unintended 
effect of exacerbating the problem of existing member self 
provision. 
To overcome this problem a cooperative finance 
structure that will unambiguously provide investment 
incentives and property rights to the membership is 
required. It is also necessary to demonstrate that 
existing cooperative management and legal structures make 
it possible to simplify and rationalize the farm portfolio 
decision with respect to cooperative membership and 
patronage. 
Existing work in the theory of agricultural 
cooperatives has focussed on solutions that provide 
farmer-members with more consistent and recognizable 
claims on cooperative surplus (Cobia et al., 1982). These 
solutions are based on two cooperative management plans 
that institutionalize the return of retained surplus 
(endowment) equity to the farmer-member on a regular 
basis. 
The first of these plans involves a capital rotation 
system. Under this system the cooperative continuously 
rotates its oldest capital (valued at par) back to the 
members that provided it. This requires that the 
cooperative continuously acquire new capital through the 
retention of surplus or some other method. A rotation 
period is often fixed under this system. If the primary 
source of cooperative capital is retained surpluses, the 
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shorter the rotation period, the more closely member 
shares of cooperative capital mirror member shares of 
patronage. 
The second plan is referred to as a base capital 
plan. Under this system the cooperative regularly makes 
an appraisal of capital needs for maintaining and 
improving facilities and operations. These capital needs 
are then apportioned among the membership with regards to 
their current period's patronage shares. Members whose 
accumulated equity falls below their base capital 
requirements must ante up (generally through increased 
retention of patronage-based returns). Members with 
excess accumulated equity (valued at par) have capital 
returned to them by the cooperati ve. 
Both of these systems and their variants provide the 
farmer-member with a more consistent and realizable claim 
on individual shares of the cooperative endowment. Each 
recognizes the importance of the return of equity capital 
to retired members or to long-term members that may be 
over-invested. Each, however, remains completely 
dependent upon patronage shares for all surplus retention 
and rotation. 
While each of these plans addresses problems of the 
return of capital, neither provides for return on capital. 
While the surplus pool that is allocated and paid out is 
equivalent to profits that represent return on capital to 
a non-cooperative firm, it is paid on a patronage-share 
basis rather than on an investment-share basis. It is 
this pay-out trigger that makes these distributions 
returns to patronage (even if unrecognized ) rather than 
returns to investment. The source of the pay-out pool is 
not important from an incentive standpoint. As a result, 
neither the base capital plan or the capital rotation plan 
provides for any reduction of the price-dominance in the 
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cooperative-member relationship. To accomplish this, the 
cooperative must set up explicit capitalization 
relationships with the membership that formalize 
utilization rights and credit functions. 
This does not suggest that the cooperative cease to 
provide assistance to under-invested members. It does 
require that assistance in meeting capitalization 
requirements become explicit. This provides a direct link 
between cooperative investment and the farmer-member 
portfolio; moving credit relationships, collateral values, 
and capital claims back to the farm level. 
This chapter has pointed out that cooperatives are 
currently structured on a transaction-based paradigm. It 
is suggested that the cooperative ' s marketing and input 
supply operations fit into this framework . Grain storage 
and custom application services, however, are better 
understood as capital pools. 
The decisions of farmer-members to acquire capacity 
within these capital pools are strongly influenced by 
estimations of access risk. A review of risk-framing 
theory indicates that, in the absence of defined access 
rights, cooperative capital pool goods will be over-
provided on both a cooperative and an individual basis . 
Additionally, there is reason to assume that private 
capacity will generally be utilized first; leaving the 
cooperative as a reservoir of excess capacity. 
Finally, it is noted that current efforts to 
rationalize farmer-member claims against cooperative 
operating surplus have been focussed on the return of 
capital to the farmer rather than a return on the farmer ' s 
capital. As a result, these efforts do not address the 
underlying incentive problems that exist with respect to 
member utilization of cooperative facilities. 
Cooperative structure must reflect both the 
55 
transaction-based and the capital-pooling functions of the 
cooperative. A structure that succeeds at this will also 
explicitly recognize and treat each member as an owner as 
well as a patron. This will result in the member treating 
the cooperative as an asset as well as a resource. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE COOPERATIVE AS A SYSTEM OF CLUBS 
The economic theory of clubs is well-suited to 
conceptually structure both the transaction-based and 
capital pooling aspects of the agricultural cooperative. 
The joint ownership and utilization aspects of club theory 
also allow us to structure cooperative investment 
requirements to provide economically rational incentives 
to cooperative membership. 
A club good is an excludable and partially rivalrous 
good that is characterized by congestible non-exhaustion 
throughout a significant range of consumption as the 
number of individuals utilizing it increases. A club is a 
voluntary group deriving mutual benefits from sharing a 
club good. Common examples of club goods in the 
literature include swimming pools and busy commuter 
thoroughfares. In both cases these goods avail themselves 
to multiple consumers and cost sharing. In each, however, 
a point is reached where the cost-sharing advantages of 
increased utilization are met by disutilities or costs of 
increased crowding. Similar relationships exist in 
recreational facilities (golf and racquet clubs, etc.), 
public services (fire protection), and even military · 
alliances. 
A club good is unlike private goods (where additional 
consumers must have their own units of the good in order 
to consume) or public goods (where additional consumers 
can always utilize the benefits of any unit of the good 
with no loss accruing to other users). A club good is 
such that an additional consumer causes a reduction in the 
cost per consumer of providing the good (a benefit to 
other consumers) and an increase in the congestion of the 
good due to use (a cost to other consumers). As a result, 
individuals that are allowed the possibility of acquiring 
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a club good and one or more non-club goods are faced with 
deciding both how much of each good to acquire and how 
many other individuals to share the acquisition of the 
club good with. 
Club theory was independently developed by both 
Buchanan (1965) and Olson (1965) to study goods that fall 
into the gap between pure public goods and pure private 
goods. The theory of clubs is a recent entry into the 
field of cooperative analysis. The theory has been 
directly applied to investigate factor usage and optimal 
membership in consumer cooperatives (Anderson, Porter, and 
Maurice, 1979 and 1980), to determine conditions 
pertaining to the optimal number of cooperatives from an 
economy-wide perspective (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1981), 
and technological incentives for cooperative formation 
(McGuire, 1972). In a broader sense club good theory 
generally applies to cooperative analysis in addressing 
the incentive structure necessary to sustain voluntary 
efforts to collectively solve the economic problems of 
shared provision. General surveys of club theory have 
been written by Sandler and Tschirhart (1980), Cornes and 
Sandler (1986), and Sandler (1992). 
Several agricultural economists (Sapiro, 1923; 
Trifon, 1961; Staatz, 1987) have investigated club-related 
aspects of the cooperative. In general, however, they 
have not recognized that these aspects fit into the 
broader theory of club goods. Perhaps this is due to the 
variety of cooperative operating and financial structures. 
Perhaps it is due to the lingering division between the 
vertical integration and independent firm perspectives; 
which tends to separate provision and finance questions 
from questions of membership. As the situation remains, 
agricultural economists have not successfully approached 
the problems of organization, finance, and patronage 
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incentives within agricultural supply and marketing 
cooperatives from the perspective of the theory of club 
goods. 
In the cooperative context, we could envision a 
number of farmer-members, each facing a production 
function 
where 
(39) 
M1 is the i~ farm's marketed output of joint farm-
cooperative production activity; 
xFi is a consolidated farm-level input; 
Xe is a consolidated cooperative-level input; 
n is the number of cooperative members sharing Xe . 
This production function can be visualized as an 
example of either a marketing cooperative or an input 
supply cooperative. M1 , for the marketing cooperative, 
can be viewed as the farm output marketed through the 
cooperative with ~ representing cooperative marketing 
services. For the input supply scenario, M1 can represent 
the output marketed by the farm with ~ being an input 
supplied by the cooperative . 
Assume that at any point in time the market price of 
M, P"' is fixed and that the factor price of Xp1 is one . 
Finally, assume that the cost of ~to the individual 
farmer-member is 
(40) 
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or the average cost of the club facility or resources. 
The number of cooperative members, n, appears in the 
production function as a variable cause of congestion. It 
is assumed that increasing the number of members sharing a 
particular amount of club resource will cause a decline in 
output per member due to congestion which might manifest 
itself in increased queuing time, longer processing times 
for transactions, or a less pleasant or safe operating 
environment. The cost function of Xe also contains n 
due to the assumption that increased membership will 
increase maintenance, paperwork, etc. Finally, the cost 
resulting from the combination of a given level of Xe and 
a given level of membership is shared equally by the 
membership. 
In this simple case, the farmer-member attempts to 
maximize profits 
(41) 
where 
(42) 
is the farmer-member's resource constraint. 
The first order conditions for profit maximization 
are 
0 (43) 
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(44) 
(45) 
From these equations we can see that the marginal value 
product of increasing farm input, x Pi , must equal the 
factor price of Xr 1 , or 1. The marginal value product to 
the farmer-member of increasing the cooperative input, Xe , 
must be equal to the farmer-member's share of the marginal 
cost of Xe · Finally, the decrease in marginal value 
product for a given level of Xe due to increases in 
membership, n, plus the increase in cost associated with 
the increasing membership must be equaled by the 
corresponding reduction in the farmer-member's cost share 
(46) 
The first order conditions also provide us wi th the 
marginal rates of technical substituti on and 
transformation between Xe and Xp1 and between n and Xr 1 
= (47) 
(48) 
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Equation 47 provides the provision condition for the 
cooperative input relative to farm input. The provision 
decision requires the equation of the marginal rates of 
technical substitution between the club and private goods 
for the entire membership and the marginal rate of 
transformation for the club and private goods in the 
marketplace. 
Equation 48 provides the membership condition. The 
membership condition illustrates that trade off between 
the marginal benefits that result from additional 
memberships (the reductions in club good cost per member 
that translate into an enhanced ability to consume the 
non-club good) and the costs that result from the marginal 
memberships (increased congestion or decreased production; 
and increased maintenance, depreciation, transaction, and 
uncertainty costs that accrue to existing members as 
memberships are increased). 
The provision and membership decisions must be made 
simultaneously because they are determined by a common set 
of variables. 
In this simple model we have assumed that membership 
is equated with the uniform utilization of the entire 
cooperative input, Xe , by each individual member. In 
reality, the member of a cooperative or club must 
determine the rate at which to utilize the good acquired. 
Being the member of a typical grain cooperative does not 
require continuous utilization. Club membership allows 
the member the option of utilization. 
The utilization decision requires that the marginal 
value of actual utilization of the club good by a member 
be equated with the marginal costs of each utilization. 
The marginal costs of a visit include the congestion costs 
that the visit imposes upon other members, the increased 
maintenance or depreciation costs that the actual 
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utilization of the good entails, and the transaction costs 
of monitoring the usage incurred by the visit. These 
costs are actually incurred by the use of the good, and 
are not the same as the costs of acquiring it. The 
utilization of the good, once it has been acquired, is 
essentially a private act. 
In general, a club characterized by identical members 
and constant utilization (as described in the equations 
above) is financed by a user fee or toll that captures the 
marginal costs that an individual member's utilization 
imposes upon others. This toll can be collected up-front 
as a membership fee or can be paid on an individual visit 
basis. In the case where members are constrained to 
constant utilization, this fee is most efficiently 
collected as a one-time membership fee, as per visit fees 
impose an unnecessary transaction cost upon both the 
member and the club. 
In the case of variable utilization, the toll must be 
at least partially made up of a per visit fee, as future 
usage cannot be foreseen with certainty. Even if perfect 
foresight on the part of all parties can be assumed, 
Berglas (1976) has demonstrated that per visit fees are 
necessary for setting optimal visitation rates if 
visitation is variable. If visitation is fixed, the costs 
of visitation can be represented as fixed costs and 
charging a uniform one-time membership fee does not affect 
the member's decision to utilize the club. Where 
visitation is variable the member's decision to visit the 
club is independent of the initial membership decision and 
each visitation entails a separate cost-benefit analysis. 
In this environment it is necessary that the actual costs 
of each visit be evaluated in each visitation decision. A 
single up-front membership fee in this instance results in 
the marginal cost of each visit being recognized by the 
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member as zero, resulting in over utilization of the 
facility. 
Where the cost structure of X e provides increasing 
marginal costs and demand is sufficient to allow a toll to 
be set at or above average cost, a per visit toll will be 
sufficient for the club to finance itself. In instances 
where the cost structure of X e results in decreasing 
marginal costs throughout the relevant utilization range, 
a toll set at marginal cost will not be sufficient to 
finance the club. In this case, a toll set equal to 
average cost (which restricts utilization to levels below 
the optimum), a two-part tariff (to offset fixed 
procurement costs), or an outside subsidy (which is, 
basically, a two part tariff where the parts are paid by 
separate entities) of the club is needed in order to 
guarantee sufficient funding. 
The case of the grain cooperative described in 
chapters 3 and 4 loosely fits the description of a club 
facing decreasing marginal costs throughout the range of 
utilization. Decreasing costs are assumed due to the 
large investment in fixed grain and bulk commodity storage 
that generally characterizes a grain cooperative. 
The cooperative described makes use of both the two-
part tariff and what amounts to an outside subsidy in 
order to fund itself . The two-part tariff is encountered 
through the fixed membership fee (I 2 ) coupled with 
transaction prices at market or near-market levels. To 
the extent that the sum of an individual's membership fee 
and transaction charges is insufficient to cover that 
member's share of cooperative fixed and operating costs, a 
subsidy is needed. The cooperative endowment of retained 
operating surpluses acts as an outside subsidy with 
respect to its effects on patronage incentives. To the 
extent that the endowment is made up of unallocated 
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surpluses retained from past cooperative members, the 
endowment can be viewed as a true subsidy to existing 
members. Even that portion of the endowment made up of 
surpluses allocated to current members has the effect of 
an outside subsidy because it is found money and carries 
no opportunity costs in the eyes of the farmer member. 
Specifications for the Cooperative 
Up to this point, the discussion of cooperative 
structure and property interests has been restricted to a 
one dimensional entity. The cooperative has either 
provided input supplies to the farmer-members or marketed 
their output. This vantage point has been sufficient to 
demonstrate that the current structure results in no 
direct returns on cooperative investment. It has also 
been sufficient for providing a brief overview of clubs 
from the perspective of the agricultural cooperative. 
A demonstration of the applicability of club good 
theory to the workings of a midwestern grain cooperative, 
however, would be a simplistic exercise if it did not 
account for the multiple functions that such an 
organization serves. This section will describe how a 
midwestern grain cooperative can be viewed as a collection 
of structures serving specific member interests. 
Organizing the cooperative as separate units is not a 
new idea. It was addressed by Sapiro (1923;90) in 
describing the California model for perishable produce 
cooperatives: 
The association without capital stock is ideal for the 
marketing association. If a building, a warehouse, or 
packing plant is needed, no matter how cheap or 
expensive, we organize a subsidiary organization. 
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For the purposes of this discussion, we assume that 
the cooperative exists and that it operates in an 
environment where prices are fixed and known at any point 
in time. We also assume that at any given point in time 
it charges, pays, and receives competitive prices for 
supplies, grain from farmers, and grain sold forward into 
the market channel, respectively. 
performs four separable operations: 
A. Marketing member output (grain); 
B. Supplying production inputs 
(fertilizers/chemicals); 
The cooperative 
c. Providing storage facilities for uncommitted 
grain; 
D. Providing a custom application service for inputs. 
In terms of the discussion in chapter 4, operations A 
and B are transaction-based activities. Operations c and 
D are capital stock pooling activities. This entire group 
of services can be visualized as a single multiproduct 
club (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1991; Brueckner and Lee, 
1991). For the purposes of this exposition, however, a 
description of the club aspects of the separate activities 
is more tractable. In either case, all of these 
operations can be structured as clubs that maintain 
cooperative benefits and strengthen property rights. 
Each of the clubs is characterized by the increasing 
returns to scale of joint provision over the levels of 
provision generally available to a single farmer-member. 
However, at the joint level both the input supply 
operation, B, and the custom service operation, D, are 
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assumed to be characterized by decreasing returns to 
scale. In operations A and c, marketing and storage, it 
is assumed that increasing returns to scale are available 
throughout the relevant production range in both singular 
and cooperative provision. 
Within the context of current cooperative structure, 
the transaction-based operations, marketing and input 
supply, are not characterized by access risk. A member is 
assured of service during each visitation even if crowding 
or congested conditions reduce the payoff of the 
visitation. current cooperative structure results in 
significant access risk for the storage and production 
services operations, which are based on pooling capital 
stock. The risk that access will be denied in these 
operations results in uncertainty in the utilization of 
the club. This will significantly affect the proposed 
structure of these cooperative clubs; particularly 
definitions of membership. 
In the case of each of these operations, it is 
important to determine whether an alternative club 
structure shows clear advantages over the current method 
of cooperative organization from a patronage incentive 
point of view. In each case, it is also possible for the 
farmer-member to form an on-farm club to satisfy 
individual farm needs. These on-farm clubs will be 
referred to as singular clubs. 
It will also be necessary to see if the proposed club 
structure is superior to these singular clubs. In the 
real world many cooperative members also have the 
opportunity to patronize profit maximizing clubs. This is 
particularly true in the transactions-based activities, 
input supply and marketing. The following sections will 
look first at the transaction-based clubs and then the 
capital stock pooling clubs. 
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Marketing 
The marketing function is generally viewed as the 
central core of the midwestern cooperative. In most 
instances, the organization was created to provide better 
market access and prices to members who viewed themselves 
as relatively small in relation to other market 
participants. The marketing operation, from a club 
perspective, also is the operation most nearly compatible 
with current cooperative structure and finance. 
The marketing function provides price advantages to 
members as a result of economies of scale. In most cases, 
a single farm unit does not market enough grain to justify 
maintaining a professional grain merchandiser. As a 
result, consolidating the grain merchandising task allows 
many farmer-members to make use of professional services 
that are not available to them individually. 
As technological advances in communications and grain 
transfer increase a merchandiser's ability to market grain 
that is not consolidated, or in-hand, when the transaction 
is made, the economies of scale available from a pure 
marketing operation continue to expand. In many cases, 
the spatial range of a single elevator or grain 
consolidation point does not produce enough grain to fully 
utilize a full-time merchandiser. 
The decreasing marginal cost of this function 
suggests that a two part tariff in needed. The fixed 
portion would include the member's share of actual 
employment costs for a grain merchandiser and the basic 
maintenance costs of the merchandiser's office and member 
accounting structures. The variable portion of the tariff 
would include the actual transaction costs of 
merchandising a particular member's grain. Because 
transactions are the actual measure of utilization, the 
fixed tariff is unrelated to use. 
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Input Supply 
Like the grain marketing operations of the 
cooperative, input supply operations are transaction 
based. However, the input supply operations of the 
cooperative are not characterized by increasing returns to 
scale at the cooperative level. Input supply is generally 
a contestable competitive operation, even in the absence 
of cooperatives. Privately held farm supply centers are 
common throughout the midwest. In the cases of specific 
inputs, particularly seed supply, farmer-members often 
compete directly against their own cooperatives. 
Input supply operations do, however, provide or 
expand economies of scope within the overall cooperative 
structure. The operation shares in administrative and 
maintenance costs, scales and common transfer facilities, 
and provides diminished transaction costs for members that 
must connect their supply transactions to credit, 
application, and marketing transactions. Reduced 
transaction costs resulting from these linkages at a 
single site provide the cooperative with important 
nonprice competitive advantages over single-service 
enterprises. This makes the input supply operation more 
cost efficient and also enhances the value of other 
cooperative services. 
As a single entity, the input supply operation can be 
modelled as a profit maximizing club facing increasing 
marginal costs. Membership can be inclusive within the 
population (potential cooperative members), or, if 
increasing costs result in ceilings on the efficient size 
of the operation, competitive forces will partition the 
population into groups that approach pareto optimality. 
Facility visitation is limited by transaction fees (tolls) 
sufficient to make the input supply operation sustainable 
and self-financing. 
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Grain Storage 
Grain storage is characterized by a very high level 
of fixed costs and is dominated by a component that would 
seem to be purely private, exhaustible, and excludable. 
This component is the grain containment facility itself. 
This structure either has space available or it is full. 
There is not a question of congestion here. 
Construction cost of grain storage per given unit of 
volume declines over the range relevant for most 
producers, and even most communities. This provides 
incentives to form storage coalitions for capturing 
economies of scale in procurement. The club aspects of 
this are three. 
First there is the declining construction cost of the 
grain containment facility itself. This provides 
incentives for common construction and shared use. 
Second, congestion is encountered in this case as 
coalition-building costs escalate in response to the 
tradeoffs required by an expanding membership. This is, 
however, congestion of the organization itself and is 
common to all coalitions. It is better addressed in the 
context of game theory and cooperative organization 
(Sorenson, Tschirhart, and Whinston, 1978; Sexton, 1986; 
Staatz, 1987). 
The third club characteristic of shared storage is 
that head space and grain transfer machinery is 
congestible as grain turnover increases. The volume of 
head space and the capacity of grain transfer machinery 
are important determinants of the level of service and the 
timeliness of access associated with a given grain storage 
facility. 
Head space is the open storage space or working 
capacity in a grain storage system that allows grain to be 
manipulated without leaving the facility. It is 
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intermediate space where material from two or more storage 
blocks can be blended or grain can be held in transition 
stages between processing or consolidation operations. To 
those unfamiliar with the operations of a grain storage 
facility, this is often mistakenly identified as empty 
space. This could not be further from the truth. Head 
space is a necessary, congestible, and common component of 
the system. 
Transfer machinery includes equipment used in putting 
grain into the facility (hoppers, conveyors, elevators, 
distributors, etc.) and load-out machinery for 
transferring material out of the facility. In the cases 
of both transfer machinery and head space congestion is 
encountered as more participants engage in moving and 
manipulating the grain stored in the system. Also; both 
head space and transfer capacity are characterized by 
decreasing unit costs in construction. 
A given volume of head space and a given size and 
capacity rating on transfer machinery defines a given 
level of club provision. Club membership is measured 
according to the number of storage blocks available. 
Visitation is determined by transfers into or out of the 
storage blocks. 
In the context of the basic cooperative club model 
outlined in equations 39 through 48, current cooperative 
storage practice would require the inclusion of a 
visitation parameter. Within the cooperative grain 
storage facility, membership can not be equated with use. 
current storage practice also requires the inclusion 
of access risk within the production function. This 
results from the current practice of lumping storage, head 
space, and transfer machinery as one good. Access is 
generally provided on a first-come first-served basis. 
This results in the potential for unsuccessful visits. 
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Unlike the representation of club access risk provided by 
Sandler, Sterbenz, and Tschirhart (1985), however, this 
risk is not randomly distributed. In cooperative storage, 
utilization patterns of all members are highly correlated, 
and individual members can assume that the utilization 
patterns of other members will match their own. The high 
positive correlation of use patterns negates the value of 
pooled capacity as an insurance or risk pool. 
In current practice, access risk is reduced as the 
number of members decreases. Access risk is eliminated in 
the single-member case. This leads members to create 
singular storage clubs on-farm even though economies of 
scale in construction costs would favor joint 
construction. 
In order to conceptualize a storage club that 
eliminates this access risk while providing joint 
economies of scale, it helps if we can identify members as 
uniform blocks of storage volume rather than as 
individuals. One could view this as a situation where 
each member privately owned a grain storage condominium 
and a club is formed to optimize the provision of working 
space and transfer machinery; remembering, however, that 
the construction or provision of the actual storage 
condominium and the club goods is a single act . 
Membership is identical in that each member gets an 
identical block of storage volume, but a single entity may 
hold more than one membership. This provides the farmer-
member the flexibility to determine volume needs and the 
security of assured access to storage volume. Use is 
determined by grain turnover. 
Congestible nonexhaustion remains an access issue as 
the correlation of use patterns also affects the members' 
queuing time at the point of grain transfer. However, the 
correlation of use also ties queuing time directly to the 
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number of members or storage blocks, so this no longer is 
an uncertainty issue. 
Specifying the grain storage facility in this manner 
effectively privatizes the storage facility itself into 
grain condominiums, which are completely exhaustible and 
when maintained as a common pool are the cause of access 
risk and uncertainty. This specification also maintains 
the congestible portions of the facility, the transfer 
machinery and head space, within the club structure. The 
common construction of the entire facility allows the 
owners of the storage condominiums to benefit from 
economies of scale in provision, a further club benefit. 
The cost function associated with such a grain 
containment club is 
where 
X9 is the number of members or storage blocks; 
X e is the capacity of head space and transfer 
machinery (the primary club good); 
(49) 
v is the visitation rate (rate of grain transfers 
into or out of the facility). 
In this case the condition for membership in the 
club, which only includes the provision of head space and 
transfer capacity, is that a block of private storage 
capacity exists in conjunction with the club. As a 
result, membership, Xq, requires significant construction 
or acquisition costs in addition to club provision costs. 
Membership is no longer conceptualized as an 
individual farmer-member. Membership is a physical 
storage block and serves a production unit. This makes it 
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possible to conceptualize alternative multimember clubs 
serving individual farms, or singular clubs. Essentially, 
this construction of the problem privatizes the storage 
containment facility itself, eliminating access risk. 
We also need to recall that each farmer can be attached to 
group club storage through the cooperative or to 
individual club storage through a singular club at the 
farm level. 
Increasing returns to scale in the construction of 
transfer equipment and head space indicate that a two-part 
tariff is necessary to promote adequate utilization of the 
facility. It is assumed that members pay a fixed tariff 
equal to the fixed cost of building and maintaining the 
club facility. In addition to the fixed tariff for the 
club facility, the member also incurs a significant up-
front cost in acquiring the storage blocks that are a 
requisite for membership in the club. A user toll is then 
applied to the marginal cost of handling grain turnover. 
Because grain turnover is the congestible attribute of the 
storage system, the fixed tariff is not related to member 
use. 
If the fixed tariff is sufficient to cover the 
acquisition and fixed maintenance costs of the facility, 
visitation tolls (grain transfer charges) are required to 
cover only the visitation costs. The congestibility of 
transfer machinery and head space would suggest that tolls 
set equal to the increasing marginal cost of visitations 
would be sufficient to cover operating costs. 
Members of the storage club can conceivably transfer 
their rights in the club to any other entity that is 
eligible for club membership. This creates a market 
(albeit restricted) for member assets, and provides a 
means of capital rotation (complete with either 
appreciating or declining asset values reflecting supply 
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and demand for storage facilities) for members wishing to 
exit the club. 
The storage club can also be expanded by constructing 
additional facilities, regardless of whether these 
expanded facilities are of equal quality to existing 
structures. This and transferability provides a method 
for non-members to "bid in" to the club, by taking reduced 
payoffs. This is a necessity for preventing instability 
at the core if the storage club is not of sufficient size 
to include all of the memberships demanded (Sandler and 
Tschirhart, 1980 ) . 
custom Application Services 
The case of providing capital pools for custom 
application services differs from the storage condominium 
case in that the shared equipment is beyond the ability of 
the individual farmer-member to capitalize at the 
individual level of production, but operates with 
increasing marginal costs over the range o f pooled 
utilization. On the face of it, this would tend to argue 
for an open membership club financed by individual 
utilization tolls. 
As with the grain storage club, however, member 
utilization of custom application services displays highly 
positive correlations. There is considerable access risk 
involved in this type of service. A model in which 
capacity blocks, in terms of utilization time or acreage, 
are guaranteed and utilization is fixed is appropriate in 
this case. A membership fee that covers procurement costs 
plus the present value of future marginal costs is 
charged. This allows the member to completely internalize 
the pooled capital into the farm investment structure. 
Unlike the c ase of the grain storage facility the 
members holding custom application blocks can be 
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constrained to constant usage. The member holds an 
acreage or time allotment in the facility for each 
production cycle. This fixed allotment does not imply 
that the application facility or equipment is exhausted or 
that there is a one-to-one relationship between facility 
size and membership (as in the privatized containment 
facility of the storage club). A given unit size of 
application capacity is congestible in that it can be run 
longer hours, in the dark, with less scheduled 
maintenance, etc., if that is the level of service that a 
given membership finds optimal. 
While there is a question of changes in quality that 
are based on extreme utilization of capacity, it can be 
argued that this is part and parcel to determining the 
club's congestion threshold. A more problematic issue, 
given the timeliness constraints on the value of 
production services, is scheduling within a chosen level 
of congestion. However, even this issue can be addressed 
through variable time-dependent membership fees (much like 
variable rates on time-share resort condominiums), queuing 
systems, or bidding clubs (where club membership simply 
provides the right to bid on fixed amount of capacity). 
In any case, if the member chooses not to utilize the 
allotment, it can be sold to other potential club members; 
either permanently or for the single cycle. The club can 
be expanded in the same manner as the grain condominium 
club to allow bidding in by potential members. 
Summary of the Club Specification 
This description serves to demonstrate how a club 
structure can be set up to serve the needs of a midwestern 
grain cooperative. In some instances, this is already 
happening at the cooperative management level. Grain 
storage condominiums are becoming a reality at many 
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farmers cooperatives. The structures that are outlined 
here include one where usage is constant (custom 
application services) and one where total costs should be 
recoverable through provision at competitive pricing 
(input supply). In the cases of grain marketing and 
storage two-part tariffs are necessary to cover the high 
fixed cost component of a decreasing cost operation and to 
privatize a necessary but exhaustible portion of the 
facility. 
The structure suggested here provides each member 
with ownership interests in the essentially private 
interests of the cooperative. This will not prevent the 
farmer-member from either creating a singular club to 
serve individual needs at the farm level or patronizing a 
private profit-maximizing club. It will, however, force 
the farmer-member to recognize the effects of such actions 
on the cooperative investment. It will also minimize the 
effect of these actions upon other members. 
Privatizing ownership of cooperative capital 
structures also provides other benefits. Individual 
farmer-members that do not own land are given the 
possibility of acquiring guaranteed storage without 
incurring the risks and costs inherent in placing 
permanent structures upon leased ground. Collateral 
values and credit functions for cooperative facilities are 
largely moved back to the farm level; allowing the farmer-
member to selectively finance and/or liquidate his 
operation as the individual situation dictates. This also 
allows the farmer-member the limited ability to utilize 
cooperative investments as collateral for other 
investments; providing potential creditors with a 
marketable position (which current cooperative 
organization does not) and an easily verifiable analysis 
of collateral condition (which is difficult to obtain for 
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individual on-farm equipment). 
Within this structure, the farmer-member continues to 
benefit from the economies of scale that make cooperative 
activity attractive. Nothing in the club formulation 
violates purely cooperative benefits to the farm. 
The club arrangement does require explicit financing 
arrangements, however. This is a sharp split from the 
current practice of financing cooperative facilities 
through use of the endowment. The endowment can generally 
be viewed as an appropriation of capital from senior 
members of the cooperative. Its use in subsidizing 
facilities and membership costs is an implicit form of 
financing junior memberships. 
Under the club framework described here, senior 
members would have the option of providing credit to 
junior members on a private basis or through an explicit 
cooperative arrangement. Senior members would benefit 
from the option of removing capital from the cooperative 
by selling their capacities to other members. Junior 
members would benefit from an expanded collateral base at 
the farm level and access guarantees for their cooperative 
capacity. 
Issues in the Literature of Club Goods 
While this description of the cooperative as club 
good has been greatly simplified in terms of both the 
cooperative and the theory of club goods, several 
important topics in club good theory have direct 
implications for midwestern cooperatives. The discussion 
below identifies some of these issues and places them in 
the perspective of the club formulation of the farmer's 
cooperative. 
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Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Memberships 
Club theorists have put forth a number of models 
dealing with the efficiency of mixed clubs (heterogeneous 
membership) as opposed to clubs with homogeneous 
memberships. In looking at this distinction from the 
farmer cooperative perspective, we must look at members 
and memberships as being attached to production units 
rather than to individuals. The cooperative enhances 
returns to production rather than increasing individual 
utility. 
The homogeneous/heterogeneous distinction is not 
particularly at issue in the transaction-based operations 
in the cooperative club described above. It is assumed 
that the member either markets grain or does not. If 
grain is marketed the same cost/price issues are relevant 
to all production units. Identical input supplies are 
available from several sources at competitive prices. 
Both operations reduce directly to identical transactions 
where an assumption of homogeneity is easily justified. 
This distinction does become relevant to the capital 
pooling operations of the cooperative, however. Grain 
storage can be built for several purposes; including 
speculation on market prices, holding grain for feed, or 
maximizing harvest speed by removing transportation 
bottlenecks. Because each of these needs may imply 
different time frames and service levels, homogeneity can 
not necessarily be assumed. 
The importance of this to the cooperative lies in the 
debate over whether mixed clubs can be optimal. Several 
club theorists (see the evaluative survey by Sandler and 
Tschirhart, 1980; Berglas, 1976; Berglas and Pines, 1981 
and 1984) have suggested that mixed clubs will not be 
optimal and that heterogeneous groups should be 
partitioned into smaller homogeneous clubs. If this is 
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the case, different storage uses could reasonably result 
in separate storage clubs. If the singular storage or 
application clubs that exist on-farm result from the 
heterogeneity of storage purposes, a club formulation of 
the cooperative might be expected to change the property 
relationships within cooperatives . In this case, however, 
the club formulation would not be expected to change the 
pattern in which all club facilities, singular and 
cooperative, are distributed. 
On the other hand, the analysis of Sandler and 
Tschirhart (1980 and 1984) indicates that segregation is 
only required where members are constrained to financing 
the club equally. Where this constraint is not invoked, 
mixed clubs can be optimal. If mixed clubs can be 
optimal, access risks can be removed, and economies of 
scale in provision exist; we would expect the formulation 
of the cooperative on a club basis to alter both the 
property interests within the cooperative and the pattern 
in which all club facilities, singular and cooperative, 
are distributed. More specifically, the formulation of 
the cooperative facility as a club should tend to 
concentrate future facility development within the 
cooperative club rather than in singular on-farm 
facilities. 
Private For-profit Clubs 
The existence of prof it-maximizing clubs has been 
investigated by Berglas (1976), Boadway (1980), and 
Scotchmer (1985). Each concludes that private profit-
maximizing firms can provide club goods at an optimal 
level where competitive price structures exist and the 
population can be partitioned into homogeneous groups of 
sufficient size for club maintenance. 
The cooperative club described above faces 
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competition from private profit-maximizing clubs in the 
input supply operation. As noted above, this is a 
transaction-based operation within the cooperative, and an 
assumption of homogeneity is easily justifiable. In fact, 
the cooperative often faces this competition from its own 
members. The privately owned farm supply store is not 
rare in the midwest. The farmer, often a cooperative 
member, that markets seed to other farmers, cooperative 
members and non-members alike, is also not uncommon. It 
is likely that the cooperative is able to maintain its 
position in this activity due to the reduced transaction 
costs available to members that are able to consolidate 
production activities at the cooperative. 
One might also expect to see private goods clubs 
competing with the cooperative in the provision of custom 
application services. This, however, is becoming more the 
exception than the rule as the so-called "Custom Farmer" 
becomes a rarity in the midwest. The demise of the Custom 
Farmer may be due to the over provision of on-farm capital 
stock as a farmer response to access risk (as in the 
cooperative case), or it could be due to the ability of a 
farmer to purchase inputs and make application 
arrangements in a single transaction at a cooperative. 
Surprisingly, cooperatives are seeing continually 
more intense competition from profit-maximizing clubs 
(private limited-service grain marketing firms) in the 
area of their marketing operations (Ginder, 1985). This 
is not to be expected, as the marketing activity is a 
decreasing cost operation. A partial explanation for this 
may be found in the analysis of multiproduct clubs. 
Multiproduct Clubs 
As pointed out in the initial description of the 
cooperative as a club, the description could have been 
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presented as a multiproduct club rather than as four 
separate clubs. The existence of multiproduct clubs has 
recently been investigated by Brueckner and Lee (1991) and 
Sandler and Tschirhart (1992). Staatz (1987) has provided 
a game theoretic analysis of the agricultural cooperative 
from a transaction cost perspective that closely 
approaches many of the aspects of a multiproduct club. 
The viability of multiproduct clubs depends upon the 
existence of economies of scope, or the ability to produce 
the multiple products in a single organization for less 
than the same products can be produced independently. 
This requires that there be some common element of cost 
shared by the multiple products that cannot be 
unarbitrarily assigned. 
In the cooperative described above such unassignable 
costs are the result of common transaction and accounting 
systems, scales and transfer equipment, rolling stock, and 
the site of operations. These economies of scope are 
instrumental in justifying the cooperative position in the 
input supply operations, and were used above as a partial 
explanation for the demise of competition for the 
cooperative's custom application services. 
The Sandler and Tschirhart (1992) analysis also 
provides some insight in the increasing private 
competition for cooperative market operations. In a 
competitive price-setting environment, it is possible for 
a least-cost multiproduct club to be unsustainable against 
collection of single product clubs or clubs that provide a 
subset of the least-cost club's products and services . 
This may be the case even when the single multiproduct 
club can provide the most efficient production of the 
complete bundle of goods relative to any combination of 
alternative clubs. This result does not depend upon the 
presence of cross-subsidization across the memberships of 
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the different activities, but it is shown that if cross-
subsidization occurs in otherwise sustainable multiproduct 
clubs the resulting fee structure will likely be 
unsustainable. 
The current method of financing cooperative 
facilities through use of an endowment makes the existence 
of cross-subsidization across activities very probable. 
The cooperative marketing activity is characterized by 
decreasing costs. As technology continues to separate the 
marketing function from the storage function, the 
capitalization needs of the marketing activity continually 
decrease. These conditions indicate that the cooperative 
could utilize a dominant market position in grain 
marketing with its ability to retain operating surplus in 
order to cross-subsidize its other activities. 
The possibility exists that single product profit 
maximizing clubs involved in grain marketing are able to 
compete with the cooperative in a decreasing cost activity 
as a result of cooperative cross-subsidization through the 
endowment. The ironic prospect of private grain marketers 
acting as competitive yardsticks relative to cooperative 
marketing organizations may justify further research on 
sustainable pricing in the cooperative context . 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
This work has addressed two major topics relative to 
the application of economic theory to the midwestern grain 
cooperative. The current structure of the economic theory 
of agricultural cooperatives was reviewed with respect to 
the actual operating structure of a cooperative. The 
application of the economic theory of clubs was presented 
as an alternative to the current firm analysis applied to 
these cooperative. 
It was shown that accepted portfolio theory, as 
applied to agricultural cooperatives, fails to adequately 
explain the relationship between farm-level investments 
and cooperative investments . This is due to the absence 
of any investment-based return on cooperative investments 
under the current structure of cooperative property 
rights. 
Member investments in the cooperative are primarily 
in the form of found money. The member often recognizes 
no on-farm opportunity costs with respect to a large 
proportion of cooperative investments or losses. As a 
result, the member has an incentive to be price-motivated 
in all patronage decisions. The representative member 
cannot be expected to behave as an active participant in 
cooperative decisions under the current structure of 
cooperative property rights. 
Current property rights were designed for a 
cooperative that fulfilled primarily the transaction-based 
needs of the farmer-member. These rights are structured 
to promote ease of entrance into the cooperative, and do 
not address the access risk problems that become 
increasingly important as the cooperative becomes a 
capital pool for sharing long-term investments in 
production equipment. The lack of access rights in the 
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capital pool environment are shown to provide incentives 
for private provision and duplication of investments in 
the cooperative capital pool. 
A model based on the theory of clubs is presented as 
the basic building block for structuring cooperative 
ownership interests to correct the current shortfalls in 
membership incentives. It is shown that the cooperative 
can be partitioned into functional units within a 
multiproduct club framework. 
Memberships are recognized as being tied to 
productive units rather than to individuals. This is an 
important point in that it allows individual participants 
to hold more than one membership block while maintaining 
the justifiable possibility of a homogeneous membership. 
This membership formulation also allows the consistent 
representation of on-farm provision as singular clubs. 
The ability of the structures of club theory to 
handle provision and membership decisions simultaneously 
while also determining utilization costs and tolls 
separately is shown to be very useful in structuring the 
cooperative to privatize exhaustible components. This 
analysis also argued that cooperative goals and benefits 
do not have to be foregone in order to define property 
rights under the structure of club theory . 
In moving acquisition costs into an explicit 
membership fee, the club structure defined here 
rationalizes credit functions by opening up what had been 
the subsidization of credit for new members with resources 
withheld from an identifiable class of cooperative 
members. Recognizing this transfer explicitly allows 
members to retain the cooperative benefits of collective 
action while more accurately accounting for investment and 
cost trade offs in the production function. 
This work also brings the economic theory of 
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cooperatives more into line with actual practice among 
progressive cooperatives. In many instances, these 
cooperatives are already treating storage facilities as 
pooled capital goods and are parcelling out blocks of 
capacity on a long-term condominium basis. 
Finally, several issues within the theory of clubs 
are discussed relative to the agricultural cooperative. 
Several of these issues have direct bearing on current 
cooperative problems. 
While this analysis has only scratched the surface of 
the potential for the use of club goods in the theory of 
agricultural cooperatives, it has begun the process. It 
is hoped that thi s work will lead to questions on the 
aspects of intergenerational clubs and clubs with 
marketable or quasi-marketable memberships. From a public 
policy standpoint, investigation into the optimal 
provision of cooperative and singular clubs would be 
useful. 
In addition, more detailed technical work needs to be 
done to attempt to tie the individual cooperative club 
structures detailed here into a single hierarchy or 
multiproduct club. The unity of multiple clubs is a 
given. The clubs outlined here benefit from economies of 
scope in the real world. Scales and maintenance brigades 
are maintained in common. The very site displays 
economies of scope in that members can combine business 
activities without additional travel-related transaction 
costs. 
Much remains to be done. 
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